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or simplest shapes of all problems that occur elsewhere. Neither mathematics nor any other application of logic in the sciences can supply the place of a logical training.

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## KANT'S ANTHROPOLOGY.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF IMMANUEL KANT BY A. E. KROEGER.

(Continued.)

*Concerning the Weaknesses and Diseases of the Soul in regard to its Faculty of Cognition.*

### A.

#### GENERAL DIVISION.

§ 43. The defects of the faculty of cognition are either *weaknesses* or *diseases* of the *mind*. The diseases of the soul, in their relation to the faculty of cognition, may be subdivided under two chief divisions. The one is called the *mood disease* (*hypochondria*) and the other is called the *perturbed mind* (*mania*). In regard to the former, the patient is well aware that the current of his thoughts is not all right, his reason not having sufficient self-control to direct, check, or hurry on the direction of that current. Untimely joy and untimely sorrows—hence moods—change as does the weather, which we have to take even as it comes. So far as the second is concerned, it is a voluntary flow of thought, which has its own—subjective—rule, but runs contrary to the (objective) current of thought, which harmonizes with the laws of experience.

In regard to the sensuous representation, a disorder of the mind is called either *idiocy* or *insanity*. As an upsetting or topsy-turvy of the power of judgment and of reason, it is called *craziness* or *derangement*. The man who in his imaginations habitually neglects to compare them with the laws of experience (*i. e.*, who dreams while awake) is a *phantastic person*—a man of whims; if he does so with *pathos* (*Affekt*) he is an *enthusiast*. Unexpected promptings of a phantastic person are called *moods* of phantasticity (*raptus*).

Simpletons, stupids, numskulls, blockheads, and fools are distinguished from deranged people not only in regard to degree, but also in regard to the different qualities of their moods; and the former are not yet qualified for the insane asylum, which is a place where men must be kept in order, by another's reason, in spite of the maturity and strength of their own age, in view of their inability to attend to themselves to the smallest affairs of life. Insanity when allied to pathos is *madness*, which may often be original, but, at the same time, may come involuntarily, in which case it comes near to *genius*. Let one instance the poetic inspiration (*furor poeticus*). But such an influx of the more gentle but unruly current of ideas, when it touches reason, is called *flightiness* (*Schwärmerei*). To brood over one and the same idea, which yet has no possible object—for instance, over the death of a husband—who, after all, cannot be called back to life—simply in order to find rest in the pain itself, is dumb *craziness*. *Superstition* is rather allied to insanity (*Wahnsinn*), and *flightiness* rather to *craziness* (*Wahnwitz*). The latter sort of mental disease is also often called, in a milder phrase, *exaltation* or *eccentricity*.

To talk wildly when in a fever or an attack of aberration—say, in a state of epilepsy—which is often excited sympathetically by a powerful imagination through the mere fixed gaze of a madman (for which reason persons of very excitable nerves should not extend their curiosity to the very cells of such unfortunates), is, nevertheless, not to be treated as insanity. But that which is called a conceit is not a disease of the mind, for that is generally understood to be a moody aberration of the inner sense, but is usually a *haughtiness* which borders on insanity; and its claim that others should, in comparison with such a person, despise themselves, runs entirely contrary to its own purpose; just as in the case of madmen. For, by raising such a claim, he excites those same people to curtail his vanity in all possible respects; to ridicule him, and expose him to laughter on account of his offensive foolishness.

More mild is the expression, he is *crotchety* (German, “he has a cricket in his head”), (has a *marotte*), a principle which is claimed to be popular, though it nowhere finds approval among the wise. As an instance, let me cite the case when a man claims the gift of certain presentiments, similar to the inspirations of SOCRATES, or of certain influences said to be based on experience, though they are

utterly inexplicable, such as sympathy, antipathy, idiosyncrasy, etc. (*qualitates occultae*), which chirp like a cricket in the brain, and which, nevertheless, no one else can hear.

The mildest of all manners of overstepping the limits of sound reason is the riding of a *hobby-horse*; a disposition to employ one's self purposely with pet objects of the imagination, which the understanding merely plays with for its occupation, as with a real business, and thus, as it were, a busied idleness. For old people of competence, and who have retired from business, this disposition, which retreats again, as it were, into careless childhood, is not only healthy, as an agitation which always keeps the vital forces astir, but also amiable. At the same time it is ridiculous to such a degree that the ridiculed himself must good-humoredly join in the laugh against him. But even with the young and busy people this hobby-riding serves as a recreation; and those wise-aces who criticise such petty, innocent follies with pedantic seriousness deserve STERNE'S admonition: "Why, let every one ride his hobby-horse up and down the streets of the city, *provided he does not force you to mount behind him.*"

## B.

### *Concerning the Weakness of the Faculty of Cognition.*

He who lacks wit is called *dull* (*obtusum caput*). Nevertheless, he may have a very good mind for matters that concern only the understanding and reason. But let no one ask him to attempt the poet; as in the case of CLAVIUS, for instance, whom his tutor was about to apprentice to a blacksmith, because he could make no verses, but who, when he got a mathematical book in his hands, became a great mathematician. A mind of *slow* comprehension is not necessarily a weak mind; even as a mind of *quick* comprehension is not always thorough, and often very shallow.

A lack of judgment without wit is called *stupidity* (*stupiditas*); with wit it is called *silliness*. He who shows judgment in business affairs is called *clever*; if he combines wit with judgment, he is called *smart*. He who merely affects either of these qualities—that is, the pretentious *wit* as well as the would-be *smart* man—is disgusting. Failures and missteps *sharpen the wit*; but he who

has reached such a height in this school that he can make others smart through their failures, has *dulled* his own wit. *Ignorance* is not stupidity; as in the case of the lady who, to the question of an academician, "Do horses eat also at night?" replied, "How can so learned a man be so stupid?" But it is a proof of good understanding if a person knows only how to question well (so that he may be properly advised on the subject, either by nature or by some other person).

A person is called a *simpleton* when his mind is unable to comprehend *much*; but this does not constitute him stupid, unless he comprehends it wrongly. Honest but *stupid*—as some people improperly describe. "Pomeranian servants," for instance, is a false and very censurable expression. It is false, because honesty—fulfilling duty on principle—is practical reason. It is very censurable, because it presupposes that every one who feels himself able thereto would cheat, and that his not cheating arises only from his inability. Hence the proverbs: "That man has not invented powder"; "He will not betray his country"; "He is no wizard," etc., betray misanthropic principles, namely, in this, that even when we presuppose the good-will of those persons whom we know, we cannot be sure of it; but can be sure only in regard to their inability or incapacity. Thus, as HUME says, the Grand Sultan does not confide his harem to the virtue of those whom he appoints its guardians, but to their inability—by appointing black eunuchs.

To be very limited (narrow-minded) in regard to the *extensiveness* of one's conceptions does not of itself constitute stupidity; it all depends on their *quality*—on the governing principles. When people allow themselves to be gulled by treasure-finders, gold-makers, and lottery-dealers, this must not be ascribed to their stupidity, but to their evil will; that is, their purpose to become rich at the expense of others, without a proportioned exertion of their own. *Craftiness*—cunning, slyness (*versutia*, *astutia*)—is the ability to cheat others. The question now is, whether the cheat must be *smarter* than he who is easily cheated, and whether the latter is stupid. A *warm-hearted* person, who readily *trusts*—that is, believes, gives credit, etc.—is often also, though improperly, called a *fool*; because he is an easy catch for rascals; in accordance with the proverb: "When fools go to market the salesmen

rejoice." It is true, and a maxim of prudence, that I should never again trust the man who has cheated me once; for he is corrupt in his principles. But not to trust *other* people, because *one* man has cheated me, is misanthropy. The real fool is the cheat. But how if one great fraud has enabled him to place himself in such a position that he no longer needs the confidence of others? It is true that in such a case the character in which he *appears* undergoes a change, but only to this extent: that whereas the cheated cheater is *ridiculed*, men *spit upon* the lucky cheat; and thus there is, after all, no advantage to be gained by cheating.\*

\* The Palestines who live among us have fallen into the not unfounded reputation of being for the greater part addicted to cheating ever since their exile, owing to their usurious tendency. Now, it is true that it seems strange to conceive of a *nation* of cheats. But it surely is quite as strange to conceive of a nation composed altogether of merchants, the greater part of whom, united by an old superstition, recognized by the State wherein they live, aspire to no civil honors, but try to replace the loss of it by the advantages to be obtained in overreaching the people who extend to them protection, and even in overreaching each other. Now, it is true that this cannot be otherwise with a whole nation of merchants—they thus being non-productive members of society (like the Jews in Poland); and hence their constitution, sanctioned by old traditions, and even recognized by us, among whom they live (and who have certain holy writings with them in common), cannot be abrogated by us without our becoming guilty of *inconsequence*; although they make it the highest principle of their morality in dealing with us, that "Every purchaser ought to keep his eyes wide open." Instead of entering upon idle plans to make this people moral in regard to the points of cheating and honesty, I prefer to express my notion concerning the origin of this curious constitution—namely, a people composed solely of merchants.

Wealth was carried in the most ancient times by commerce from India across the land to the western coasts of the Mediterranean and the ports of Phœnicia—which includes Palestine. Now, it is true that it could also have taken its way across many other places; for instance, Palmyra, and in older times Tyre, Sidon, etc.; and, likewise, with a slight turn, across the sea, as Eziongeber and Elat; perhaps, also, from the Arabic coast to Thebes, and thus across Egypt to that same Syrian coast; but Palestine, of which Jerusalem was the capital, was also advantageously situated for the caravan trade. Probably the phenomenon of the ancient Solomonic wealth was the effect of this commerce; and the surrounding country of Palestine, even at the time of the Romans, was filled with merchants, who, after the destruction of Jerusalem—having previously established communications with other tradesmen of the same language and religion—gradually spread, together with these, into far-removed countries (into Europe), always keeping in communication with each other, and finding protection from those other countries on account of the advantages derived from their trade. It thus appears that their dispersion over the whole world, together with their union in religion and language, cannot at all be placed to the account of a *curse* pronounced upon this people, but must rather be considered a *blessing*; especially as their wealth, estimated by individual possession, probably now exceeds that of any other people of the same number of persons.—*Note by Immanuel Kant, the Author.*